States that humans are not the only animals to possess the neurological material that enables consciousness and concludes: “The absence of a neocortex does not appear to prevent an organism from experiencing affective states. Converging evidence indicates that non-human animals possess the neuroanatomical, neurochemical, and neurophysiological substrates of conscious states, as well as the capacity to engage in intentional behavior. Therefore, the strength of the evidence leads us to conclude that humans are not alone in possessing the neurological substrates of consciousness. Non-human animals, including all mammals and birds, as well as many other species such as octopuses, also possess these neurological substrates.”
Following the Cambridge Declaration, specifies that: “Which animals possess the capacity to have a conscious experience?” Although many uncertainties remain, there is broad consensus on certain points. First, there is strong scientific support for the existence of conscious experience in other mammals and birds. Second, scientific evidence indicates at least a realistic possibility of conscious experience in all vertebrates (including reptiles, amphibians, and fish) and many invertebrates (including, at a minimum, cephalopod mollusks, decapod crustaceans, and insects). Third, when there is a realistic possibility of conscious experience in an animal, it is irresponsible to ignore this possibility in decisions concerning it. We should consider the risks to animal welfare and rely on scientific evidence to address them ».
Signed by philosophers from around the world, therefore unequivocally affirms that the current use of non-human animals as resources is morally reprehensible and must end. Excerpts: “We do, however, agree on the need for a profound transformation of our relationships with other animals. We condemn all practices that involve treating animals as things or commodities. Insofar as it involves unnecessary violence and harm, we declare animal exploitation to be unjust and morally indefensible. In ethology and neurobiology, it is well established that mammals, birds, fish, and many invertebrates are sentient, that is, capable of experiencing pleasure, pain, and emotions. These animals are conscious subjects; they have their own perspective on the world around them. It follows that they have interests: our behaviors affect their well-being and are likely to do them good or harm. From a political and institutional point of view, it is possible to stop seeing animals as mere resources at our disposal. To argue the opposite would amount to ranking individuals based on a faculty with no moral relevance. Such an ableist attitude would be morally indefensible. In short, it is difficult to escape this conclusion: because animal exploitation harms animals unnecessarily, it is fundamentally unjust. It is therefore essential to work towards its elimination, notably by closing slaughterhouses, banning fishing, and developing plant-based agriculture. »
Concludes that: (excerpts): “We, legal scholars, having taken note of the Cambridge Declaration of July 7, 2012, in which these researchers concluded that ‘humans are not the only ones to possess the neurological substrates of consciousness,’ these being shared with ‘non-human animals,’ declare that animals must be considered universally as persons and not as things; that it is urgent to definitively end the reign of reification; that current knowledge demands a new legal perspective on animals; that, consequently, animals must be recognized as persons in the legal sense.”